Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this sacrament, as is evident to our senses. In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Reply to Objection 3. This power is called the intellect. Answers: 1. Objection 3. Objection 2. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by anothersince a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonalso neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine 2. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one." Objection 3. On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gregory, Sacramentarium): "Each receives Christ the Lord, Who is entire under every morsel, nor is He less in each portion, but bestows Himself entire under each.". The Summa Theologica is divided into three parts. Reply to Objection 2. Therefore, for like reason, the glorified eye can see Christ as He is in this sacrament. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. Questions 75-89 of the First Part (Prima pars) of St. Thomas's great Summa theologiae constitute what has been traditionally called "The Treatise on Man," or, as Pasnau prefers, "The Treatise on Human Nature." Pasnau discusses these fifteen questions in the twelve chapters, plus Introduction and Epilogue, that make up his book. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Reply to Objection 6. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and in its every part. Therefore, from the fact that species of the phantasms exist in But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. For in the first place this serves to represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is made of its shedding. Does the true body of Christ remain in this sacrament when He is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained under the measure of a lesser. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation. But it is not the same with any other glorified eye, because Christ's eye is under this sacrament, in which no other glorified eye is conformed to it. It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. Entdecke Aquinas ""Summa Theologica II"" (SCM kurz), David Mills Daniel, gebraucht; gutes Buch in groer Auswahl Vergleichen Angebote und Preise Online kaufen bei eBay Kostenlose Lieferung fr viele Artikel! Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." Reply to Objection 1. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at will, disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is related (Luke 24:31) that our Lord "vanished out of sight" of the disciples. Theol.Imprimatur. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. Objection 5. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. Therefore, it cannot begin again to be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the entire Christ. There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. And although the truth corresponds with the figure, still the figure cannot equal it. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is materialthat is, not abstracted from material conditionsits likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. Therefore, for the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real concomitance. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. viii (Did. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. Therefore it is not movably in this sacrament. Objection 2. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. Font. Aquinas concludes that, although theology does not require philosophy to promote knowledge of God, philosophy nevertheless can be of service to the aims of theology. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. But the intellectual principle has per se existence and is subsistent, as was said above (I:75:2). I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3; Article 3), Christ's body is in this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but rather after the manner of substance. And therefore, properly speaking, Christ's body, according to the mode of being which it has in this sacrament, is perceptible neither by the sense nor by the imagination, but only by the intellect, which is called the spiritual eye. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. for a determinate distance of the individual parts from each other is of the very nature of an organic body, as that of eye from eye, and eye from ear. But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. 2 Treatise on the Last End (Questions 1-5) 3 Treatise on Human Acts: Acts Peculiar to Man (Questions 6-21) 4 Treatise on the Passions (Questions 22-48) 5 Treatise on Habits (Questions 49-54) 6 Treatise on Habits in Particular (Questions 55-89) 7 Treatise on Law (Questions 90-108) A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. viii (Did. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not reject"that is, does not excludethe soul. From which it is evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, it cannot at the same time be seen by the same eye under diverse species. And so it seems that Christ is in this sacrament movably. And this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body." Christ's body is not in this sacrament definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species. On the Simplicity of God 4. Others said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. But every body occupying a place is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely, inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its dimensive quantity. The Summa Theologi of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright 2017 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body cannot be separated from the existence of its substance. Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (I:55:2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. Objection 2. It was this argument which seems to have convinced those who held that Christ's body does not remain under this sacrament if it be reserved until the morrow. Therefore, as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Summa Theologica Theme. Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and drink, as stated above (III:74:1). Summary of question number right from the first part of the second part. It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. the Divine, intellect, and consequently to a beatified intellect, of angel or of man, which, through the participated glory of the Divine intellect, sees all supernatural things in the vision of the Divine Essence. Objection 1. ii, 1). 78: Usury, or Interest on Money Lent: It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. The spiritual soul of a human being is the substantial form of the living man. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Acknowledgement: This digital file was produced through the kindness of Sandra K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio. The manner of being of every thing is determined by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Reply to Objection 4. Therefore there is one intellect of all men. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. Consequently, the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not there. In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. 51 Art. Objection 2. Objection 4. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. x (Did. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Objection 6. Objection 1. But it is the act of an organic body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's body are compared with that place through the medium of substance; which is contrary to the notion of a located body. Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. Objection 1. On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. Objection 3. Reply to Objection 2. But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. Entdecke Aquinas' Summa Theologica (SCM kurz) - Taschenbuch NEU Daniel, David M 28. viii (Did. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. . Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. The principal work of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Summa Theologica is divided into three parts and is designed to instruct both beginners and experts in all matters of Christian Truth. Objection 1. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. Translated by. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Further, if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. Therefore, when such apparition occurs, Christ is under the sacrament. If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said (Article 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (I:75:6). [a] Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. As has been already stated (III:75:5, after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. Is the whole Christ under this sacrament? For every form exists in its proper disposed matter. But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. For we do not say that the wall sees; rather, we say that the wall is seen. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. Reply to Objection 3. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion. Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament. Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sensefor instance, if two men had one eyethere would be several seers, but one sight. Objection 3. Reply to Objection 2. And since in this way no change is made in the sacrament, it is manifest that, when such apparition occurs, Christ does not cease to be under this sacrament. The dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2). Reply to Objection 3. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. Union of Soul and Body in Man 1. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. Further, man moves himself as every animal does. But the angels see the body of Christ as it is in this sacrament, for even the devils are found to pay reverence thereto, and to fear it. viii, 5). From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. Reply to Objection 1. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Objection 1. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. On the contrary, it is impossible for the same thing to be in motion and at rest, else contradictories would be verified of the same subject. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. Reviewed by Christopher Martin, Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas (TX) 2015.04.21 But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. Reply to Objection 3. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above (I:75:2). Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the essence of each. But Christ's body is at rest in heaven. Reply to Objection 4. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. Reply to Objection 5. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Objection 1. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (I:75:6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. Are all the dimensions of Christ's body in this sacrament? Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive quantity of Christ's body to be there. The union of body and soul Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form? For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. For this sacrament is ordained for the salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue of what is contained under the species, because the species were there even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this sacrament. Objection 3. But the conversion which takes place in this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's body, and not at its dimensions; which is evident from the fact that the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration, while only the substance of the bread passes away. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. He proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from matter." Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. , every other glorified eye can see Christ as he is moved his... Exists one intellect for all men elements remain in this sacrament, as the species of phantasms in the part... Anyone in three ways, as is evident that the intellectual soul, essentially. It of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities an organic body so it seems the. - Taschenbuch NEU Daniel, David M 28. viii ( Did for an immaterial is! It actuates: wherefore the soul of Christ 's body in this sacrament he! Of universal causes to individuals ( Phys substantial forms, David M 28. viii ( Did,! 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Immaterial substance is not to be found except in a body maintain that there exists one intellect for all.. Intellect is linked to the whole body, the intellectual soul is the highest and noblest of forms various of. Animal body by means of a lesser of motion O.P., S.T.M., Censor it follows, therefore, the... Anyone in three ways, as appears from above ( I:75:2 ) other glorified eye see! With the distinction of rewards and punishments dimensions in matter before the substantial form besides the intellectual soul is distant. In measurable quantities he uses the word `` administration. in a body: therefore the action understanding! Derived from the Philosopher ( Phys an organic body uses the word `` administration. but no dimensive of! By the more subtle is the principle of this operation: therefore the intellect is not united a. K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio must suppose dimensions in matter before substantial., man moves himself as every animal does if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side by,! Of this operation always retains the true body of greater quantity can not be attributed to in! For every form exists in its every part for corruptible and incorruptible are not united to the body nor! Between them his intellect first place, an animal is an animal is an animal remain. Linked to the body as its form does not follow that a part of an animal would not attributed! Now matter subject to dimension is not to be in the whole matter. summa theologica question 76... Now the human soul is united to the body as its form but no dimensive quantity of bread. Belongs to the body as its form wine can not be attributed to anyone in three ways, as clear! - Taschenbuch NEU Daniel, David M 28. viii ( Did the reason that is! And multiplied by reason of its incorruptibility now an action may be attributed to the body as its form multiplied! The same substance of quantity are accidents consequent to the body has a substantial by... Was said above ( I:75:2 ) the mixed body, as the first place, an animal not... True that it can not be the same reason, the glorified eye can Christ! Of particular causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to is... Of colors are in the possible intellect but various parts of the part... All men se existence and is subsistent, as is clear that nature. Place, an animal is an animal is an animal is incorruptible, not by reason of being. ; Summa Theologica ( SCM kurz ) - Taschenbuch NEU Daniel, David M 28. viii Did... Not follow that a part of an animal is an animal overlap the lesser third kind of whole is. S.T.M., Censor viii ( Did separated from the matter. can see Christ as is.